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The Noetic Feeling of Confusion  
Abstract 
Feeling confused can sometimes lead us to give up on the task, frustrated. What is less em-
phasized is that confusion may also promote happy (epistemic) endings to our inquiries. It has 
recently been argued that confusion motivates effortful investigative behaviors which can help us 
acquire hard-to-get epistemic goods (DiLeo et al., 2019; D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). While the 
motivational power of confusion and its benefits for learning has been uncovered in recent years, 
the exact nature of the phenomenon remains obscure. In this paper we attempt to shed light on 
the nature and epistemic value of an experience we are all familiar with: the experience of being 
confused at an object, a statement, etc. We first review the psychological literature on confusion, 
where it is most often considered to be an epistemic emotion. We then propose a refined account 
of confusion, by drawing on the literature on metacognitive or noetic feelings, both in psycholo-
gy and in the philosophy of mind. In particular, we claim that confusion centrally involves the 
experience of the limits of one’s cognitive capacities, because it results from a monitoring of our 
cognitive activities as we encounter a cognitive obstacle while processing a given content. Final-
ly we show how our account may explain findings about the role of the experience of confusion 
in motivating deeper inquiry into complex problems and bringing about epistemic success in 
these cases. 




Imagine you are given a mathematical problem. After a first look at it, you realize that you 
have no idea how to solve it or even how to start with it: the information just doesn’t add up. You 
start frowning, you give it a closer look, but you remain stuck. What will you do next? Will you 
keep trying to make sense of the information you are presented with, or will you give up and 
move on to the next exercise?   
The example above might be considered a typical instance of confusion. Dewey (1910, p. 
12) claimed that: “The origin of thinking involves some perplexity, confusion, or doubt. Think-
ing is not a case of spontaneous combustion”. Experiences like perplexity and confusion might 
be indispensable ingredients of our epistemic endeavors. Inquiry, the complex process which 
sometimes results in cognitive improvement, needs an initial spark. In spite of its bad reputation, 
we think that confusion can and often does act as one. 
Even if most episodes of confusion are only accompanied by a mild feeling, this feeling is 
negatively valenced, and it can sometimes lead us to give up on the task, leaving us frustrated 
(D’Mello et al., 2014). This negative outcome of confusion has tended to overshadow another 
possible trajectory: one in which being confused results in a happy (epistemic) ending. Even if 
confusion can lead us to abandon a task when it is experienced with a high degree of intensity, it 
is a state which also motivates us to engage with the complex task we face. More specifically, it 
has recently been argued that confusion motivates effortful investigative behaviors which can 
participate in our ability to resolve complicated puzzles, and acquire hard-to-get epistemic goods 
as a result (DiLeo et al., 2019; D’Mello & Graesser, 2012).  
 While the motivational power of confusion and its benefits for learning has been uncov-
ered in recent years, the exact nature of the phenomenon remains somewhat obscure. This paper 
is an attempt to shed light on the nature and epistemic value of being confused in front of an ob-
ject, an event, a statement, etc. In the first section we review the psychological literature on con-
fusion where it is most often considered to be an emotion, and more precisely an epistemic emo-
tion. Given that confusion centrally involves the experience of the limits of one’s cognitive ca-
pacities in the face of a cognitive task, in section II we draw from the literature both in philoso-
phy and in psychology on metacognitive or “noetic” feelings, to propose a refined account of 
mechanisms behind our experience of confusion. Noetic feelings are affective states which pro-
vide information regarding the course of our ongoing cognitive operations. In accordance with 
the “competence view” of noetic feelings (Dokic, 2012), we propose to view confusion as a feel-
ing which results from a metacognitive monitoring of our cognitive operations, and which in-
forms us on our cognitive competence at a task in the face of a cognitive obstacle. In section III 
we introduce recent empirical observations in educational psychology showing a correlation be-
tween the experience of confusion and tendencies to invest more cognitive resources and efforts 
in the search for a resolution. In section IV we show how our refined model of confusion may 
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explain the role of confusion in bringing about these beneficial responses, thereby contributing to 
epistemic success in these cases. 
I. The emotion of confusion 
In their 2003 seminal paper on confusion, Rozin & Cohen asked college students to identify, via 
target reports, the emotions that others expressed in the flow of spontaneous interaction (Rozin & 
Cohen, 2003). To their surprise, the second most common descriptor reported by participants was 
confusion, a term that was virtually nonexistent in the affect or emotion literature. They further 
noted that confusion seemed to be endowed with many of the properties commonly attributed to 
emotions. Since then, a few authors in the field of educational psychology have taken interest in 
studying the impact of confusion on learning (e.g. D’Mello et al., 2014). Within this field, confu-
sion has generally been conceptualized as an emotion particularly prominent in the context of 
learning and acquiring complex information (Arguel et al., 2017). How should we understand 
our phenomenon of interest if it is to be characterized as an emotion? 
 Emotions are affective mental states typically recognized to have a felt character (subjec-
tive feeling), to go along with some physiological changes, to have a positive or a negative va-
lence (except for a few exceptions such as surprise), and to either result from or constitute an 
evaluation of an event or an object (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1999). The experience 
of being confused seems to carry all the features commonly attributed to emotions: when I feel 
confused, I experience a negative affect, I present some changes in my facial expression and bod-
ily posture, and the confusion I feel is (or results from) an evaluation of the problem I am facing. 
 Emotions can further be categorized as belonging to various types, such as aesthetic emo-
tions, moral emotions, etc. depending on the nature of the evaluative property they track. Moral 
emotions respond to “moral” values, like the just and the wicked and aesthetic emotions are 
thought to track “aesthetic” values like the sublime. Confusion has often been categorized as be-
longing to a class of emotions which track “epistemic” values and are thought to play a distinct 
role in guiding and regulating our epistemic activities. 
 In psychology, “epistemic emotions” are defined as “emotions that are caused by cogni-
tive qualities of task information and the processing of that information” (Muis et al., 2015, p. 
169). This means that epistemic emotions arise when one is facing information that one evaluates 
as new, incongruent, complex or different from one’s previous knowledge. These properties 
(complex, new, incongruent, incoherent) are viewed as the typical evaluative properties which 
epistemic emotions track in objects (Pekrun & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2012). Pekrun (2021) recent-
ly proposed that epistemic emotions can be seen as generally instigated by appraisals of cogni-
tive incongruity and a wish to resolve the incongruity. 
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 The most commonly referred to of such emotions is perhaps curiosity, but other affective 
states such as wonder, interest, surprise, feelings of certainty and confidence, are argued to fall 
into this category (Morton, 2009). Within the psychological literature, the most extensively stud-
ied epistemic emotions are surprise, curiosity, enjoyment, confusion, anxiety, frustration and 
boredom (Pekrun et al., 2017). Interestingly, this category of emotion was already mentioned by 
Darwin, who simply named them “intellectual emotions” (Darwin, 1872), thus highlighting how 
inextricable these emotions are from the cognitive processes they generate (Ellsworth, 2003).  
 Within the controversial class of epistemic emotions, further distinctions have been 
drawn. Some epistemic emotions are elicited when cognitive improvement is actually taking 
place, that is, when an epistemic gap has been filled, like feelings of understanding or eureka ex-
periences. These affective states act as indicators that cognitive operations have been successful 
in producing an output or solution to the problem, and that inquiry can hence be closed. Other 
types of epistemic emotions arise in the context of potential cognitive improvement, like curiosi-
ty ; these can be called “exploratory affects” (Lauria, forthcoming). Finally, “emotions of dark-
ness” – which include perplexity, confusion, doubt, and puzzlement – involve the experience of a 
cognitive obstacle; they signal a lack of cognitive improvement. Emotions of darkness, like ex-
ploratory affects, involve the appraisal of a gap in one’s cognition, they can be distinguished on 
the basis of the evaluative component which concerns our coping potential, or the way we view 
events in light of our ability to act on them. In emotions of darkness such as confusion, or puz-
zlement, cognitive coping is appraised as low, and one experiences an obstacle, while this is not 
necessarily the case in exploratory affects.  
 Such a specification has been confirmed by other authors, who highlight the importance 
of cognitive coping in the emergence of confusion. Silvia (2010) notably highlights the impact of 
the novelty, complexity, and coping potential appraisals on the emergence of curiosity and confu-
sion. An information is appraised as novel, complex, or unexpected, depending on the subject’s 
existing knowledge and expectations for the task (Silvia, 2010; Turner & Silvia, 2006). Different 
combinations of “epistemic” appraisals will give rise to different emotions: if information is ap-
praised as new, complex, and comprehensible, subjects will experience interest (Silvia, 2005; 
Silvia et al., 2009). In contrast, if the information is appraised as not comprehensible, subjects 
will experience confusion (Silvia, 2010). Like curiosity, confusion involves appraising an object 
as new and complex; unlike curiosity, it involves appraising the event as hard to understand. In 
sum, our cognitive coping potential is appraised as low when we experience confusion (Muis et 
al., 2018). 
 As has become apparent in the distinctions drawn above, confusion involves the experi-
ence of the limits of our cognitive capacities. The fact that confusion provides information that 
regards one’s own cognitive capacity or current epistemic position has been relatively unex-
plored in the literature. In the next section, we draw from the literature on metacognitive or 
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“noetic” feelings to propose a model of confusion as a feeling which informs us on our own cog-
nitive competence with regard to a given content or problem.  
II. The feeling of being confused 
Here we want to argue that, although we view confusion as an emotion, we believe the emotion 
literature has overlooked a critical dimension of the experience of confusion, namely the fact that 
the affective experience of confusion results from a tracking of one’s own cognitive activities as 
they unfold to process a given content or resolve a certain problem. This dimension has however 
been better captured and modeled within the literature on metacognitive or “noetic” feelings. 
Certain affective phenomena, such as the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of forgetting, 
or the tip-of-the-tongue feeling, are said to constitute a distinct class of affect, which seem to 
have this in common that they are directed at our cognitive states, and provide us with informa-
tion on the unfolding of our cognitive activities. Noetic feelings are affective experiences direct-
ed at one’s own epistemic states, events, and skills – their content is related to knowledge, igno-
rance, or uncertainty and they essentially tell the subject about the course of her own mental op-
erations (de Sousa, 2008; Dokic, 2012). In psychology, they are traditionally referred to as 
“metacognitive feelings” (e.g. Efklides, 2006). It is commonly acknowledged that we often rely 
on such epistemic feelings in our ordinary reasoning, and that we also sometimes exploit them as 
premises in deliberation.  
By contrast, epistemic emotions such as curiosity, interest, and surprise are not thought to 
primarily monitor the properties of our ongoing cognitive activities, but instead to monitor and 
signal properties of objects or situations that we encounter in the world (Meylan, 2014). They are 
thought to present these situations and objects to us as novel, incongruent, unexpected, complex, 
etc. Insofar as they produce these evaluations based on the subject’s previous experiences and 
prior knowledge, emotions always have the subject’s existing cognitive state as a reference point. 
In this sense it could be argued that the property of novelty that is attached to an object is always 
relational. However, emotions are not primarily conceived as directed at our internal states in the 
way that metacognitive or noetic feelings are thought to be. 
In this paper we are not aiming to resolve the question of whether there is indeed a fun-
damental distinction between epistemic emotions and noetic feelings. Instead, we want to high-
light the fact that the literature on noetic feelings, particularly in philosophy of mind and philos-
ophy of cognitive science, offers a way to capture an important aspect of the experience of con-
fusion, which seems to be absent from the emotion literature. This said, we believe that it is pos-
sible to adopt the model of confusion that we propose, while maintaining that confusion is an 
emotion.  
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Epistemic feelings, as Koriat puts it (2000), are “cross-level states”: they are conscious 
states which can be used as premises in reasoning just like any other piece of information, and 
are grounded on unconscious monitoring mechanisms. These feelings carry information (uncer-
tainty, rightness, etc.) about the properties of our cognitive operations, but we do not have access 
to the event which caused the mechanism to launch this signal. Examples of such phenomena in 
the literature notably include: feelings of knowing/not knowing (Koriat, 1995, 2000), tip-of-the-
tongue experiences (Brown, 2000), feelings of competence (Bjork and Bjork 1992), feelings of 
familiarity (Whittlesea et al. 2001) and feelings of ‘déjà vu’ (Brown 2003). A notorious example 
is the feeling of knowing, which is a feeling one might experience while trying to retrieve a spe-
cific information from memory. The feeling is thought to signal that one does possess the infor-
mation and should shortly be able to access that information consciously.  
The nature of these states is, however, still a matter of ongoing debate. Particularly, it is 
still an open question whether these states imply metarepresentation or mind reading capacities, 
or whether they operate at a lower level and are experienced by non-human animals and young 
infants (Carruthers, 2008). Several authors have proposed that two levels of the metacognitive 
capacity can be distinguished (Koriat, 2000; Arango-Muñoz, 2011). Although these two levels 
can interact, they have different functions and require different capacities. The lower level of 
metacognition is thought to consist merely in a capacity to monitor and control cognitive opera-
tions. The capacity to monitor and control cognitive operations does not imply that one forms a 
second-order representation about those operations or their correlate mental states. This type of 
processes involve what Dokic (2012) calls “procedural metacognition”, which consists in implic-
it monitoring and control of first-order processes. Procedural metacognition involves mecha-
nisms deployed implicitly to monitor the quality of our cognitive processes in order to generate 
spontaneous actions.     
Instead, the higher level of metacognition consists in the act of forming a second-order 
thought about a first-order one, and may be said to amount to no more than “turning our min-
dreading capacities upon ourselves” (Carruthers, 2009, p.8). It is the type of metacognition we 
engage in when we question, reassess, or evaluate our first-order thoughts in terms of reliability, 
accuracy, etc. This type of metacognition requires meta-representational capacities and, arguably, 
the possession of psychological concepts – such as perception, belief, intention, knowledge – 
which the subject ascribes in order to interpret behavior. Such metacognitive judgement is hence 
composed of a proposition, a first-order attitude directed to it, and a second-order attitude direct-
ed at the first-order attitude and the original proposition (Proust, 2007; Arango-Muñoz, 2011). In 
functional terms, noetic feelings are thought to monitor cognitive processes and motivate epis-
temic decisions accordingly, either before the action is launched or after it has been performed. 
Applying this to confusion: when I feel confused about what a certain statement means, I am try-
ing to understand the meaning of it; I am engaged in this cognitive activity, and my feeling of 
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confusion arises to provide information about how my cognitive operations are proceeding for 
this task.  
Now, what would the content of such a mental state be? If we were to try and translate it 
in ordinary language, it might be something like “I do not understand this”. In a similar way, the 
feeling of knowing might be said to signal that: “I know this”. Knowledge and understanding are 
epistemic goods which one seeks to achieve when performing cognitive tasks. While the feeling 
of knowing signals that such cognitive achievement has taken place and therefore that one now 
securely possesses the desired information, on this view the feeling of confusion signals that one 
has not reached the desired mental state; that cognitive operations have not yet delivered an out-
put that qualifies as understanding. On this view, feeling confused implies that one possesses and 
deploys metarepresentational abilities, or the ability to represent one’s own mental states, since it 
requires one to represent that one has not yet achieved the desired epistemic mental state of un-
derstanding. On this account, only creatures who possess the ability to represent their own men-
tal states may experience confusion. Is there a less demanding way to conceive of the content of 
confusion?  
 One might think that because noetic feelings track epistemic states, their content can only 
be about those epistemic states, but there is another way to conceptualize the content of these 
feelings which does not require subjects to deploy metarepresentational abilities. According to a 
certain view of noetic feelings, noetic feelings are about one’s own cognitive competence, in a 
way that is akin to feelings of physical competence (Dokic, 2012). Feelings of physical compe-
tence are affective experiences which are thought to help us gauge our competence at certain 
physical tasks. In other words, they function to help us foresee our chances of success at per-
forming a given physical action. When standing above a puddle on the edge of the sidewalk, for 
instance, you might get a feeling with the content: “Yes, I can do this jump”.  
In a similar manner, Dokic (2012) proposes that noetic feelings signal one’s cognitive 
competence at a task, helping us envisage our chances of success at resolving the problem or an-
swering the question. For instance, when asked what the capital of Peru is, and before the answer 
comes to mind, one might get a feeling with the content: “Yes I can retrieve this information” or 
“No I cannot”, which helps one foresee the result of one’s performance and guides one’s decision 
to persevere in one’s cognitive efforts or give up trying to retrieve the information. According to 
this competence view of noetic feelings, the content of noetic feelings can accordingly be formu-
lated in terms of: “I can/I cannot do this cognitive task”.  So conceived, the noetic feeling of con-
fusion does not require the deployment of metarepresentational abilities. It is a feeling which 
helps us gauge our cognitive competence at a specific task, not by deploying metarepresentations 
concepts about our own cognitive states (like “I know this/ I don’t know this”), but instead by 
gauging that our cognitive activity may or may not easily lead to the desired output (“I can/ I 
cannot do this”). 
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 Dokic argues more specifically that noetic feelings provide subjects with a type of modal 
knowledge on their cognitive competence. They yield information about what might easily hap-
pen, now or in the near future; particularly whether one’s performance is or will be successful in 
possible worlds close to the actual world. For instance, according to this view a feeling of know-
ing is a feeling that one’s performance is or will be successful in possible worlds close to the ac-
tual world. These worlds can be more or less close depending on the robustness of one’s compe-
tence. Degrees of feelings can further be modeled in terms of the modal extent to which one’s 
performance is successful, that is in terms of the closeness of the worlds in which one’s perfor-
mance is successful, given one’s competence. 
 If we try to apply this model to the experience of feeling confused at a sentence or a 
scene, we might say the following: confusion is a feeling about one’s cognitive competence in 
the sense that it appraises a cognitive obstacle as one which furthers our chances of succeeding at 
resolving a problem. It is a signal which arises as a result of facing a cognitive obstacle, and 
which functions to inform us that our cognitive competence has been challenged, and that our 
chances of success at the task are compromised.  Additionally, it is a signal, as we will argue, 1
which not only informs us that our performance may not easily lead to the desired output (given 
the cognitive obstacle detected), but which also conveniently triggers the recruitment of higher-
level, more demanding cognitive strategies in order to increase our chances of success. In short, 
confusion serves to alert us that a given cognitive task will not be so easily performed (thereby 
giving us information on our cognitive competence with respect to the task), and to launch the 
cognitive processes that will allow us to “think deeper” about the problem, thereby making it 
more likely for us to achieve understanding.  
The feeling of confusion thus results from a monitoring of our own cognitive operations 
as they are unfolding, and is a way of apprehending how close or far we are from reaching an 
understanding of the given material. The satisfaction condition of confusion – what extinguishes 
it – is the achievement of understanding. Depending on the particular object that one’s feeling of 
confusion is directed at (a statement, a mathematical problem, a novel object, etc.), achieving 
understanding can amount to such achievements as: disambiguating the information, identifying 
the source of the incoherence, resolving a contradiction, or finding a way in which the problem 
can be solved. When one achieves such an understanding and becomes conscious of it (be it 
through a feeling of understanding or a “aha” experience), confusion vanishes. What form must 
 This is not to say that the feeling of confusion amounts or is identical with a lack of confidence. Experiences of 1
confusion are likely to impact our level of confidence with regard to our ability to perform the task successfully. 
However, while levels of confidence amount to an epistemic stance, confusion is an emotional episode with distinct 
phenomenological features. In the same manner, other epistemic feelings, like feelings of knowing or not knowing, 
as defined by Koriat (1995, 2000) will inevitably impact one’s level of confidence downstream regarding whether 
we will retrieve the information as needed. In this sense, such feelings may be exploited as indications and reasons 
to update one’s level of confidence, i.e. one’s graded epistemic stance on whether we will successfully complete the 
task or not.
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understanding take and what degree of understanding must be reached in order to extinguish 
one’s feeling of confusion is likely to depend on the nature of the task itself, its relevance to 
one’s goals, and on individual epistemic needs.  
 Based on the competence view of the feeling of confusion just sketched, can we shed 
some light on recent research concerning the positive impact of confusion on learning? In the 
next section we examine this literature and propose a novel perspective on the observed results. 
III. Feeling confused and learning 
 On the view sketched above, confusion helps us gauge the feasibility of a cognitive task 
given one’s competence. It helps explain why confusion triggers various behavioral and mental 
reactions such as a tendency to persevere and “think deeper”. Indeed, if confusion was an experi-
ence of an object as literally incomprehensible, as some previous models seemed to suggest, it 
would just result in a motivation to terminate the ongoing inquiry. However, this is not systemat-
ically the case: confusion gives rise to a host of different reactions. According to our view, this is 
because confusion provides fine-grained information regarding our cognitive coping potential for 
the task we face, which we can then exploit in our practical reasoning about what to do next; in 
particular in deciding whether to persevere and invest the required amount of effort in the task, or 
give up on it.  
 In case one perseveres, success is not guaranteed, and if the costs (in time and energy) of 
inquiry come to overweight the predicted epistemic benefits, other emotions like frustration and 
boredom arise and might lead us to quit inquiry. When confusion is followed by frustration and 
boredom in this way, researchers speak of “hopeless confusion” (DiLeo et al., 2019). This is cer-
tainly a possible trajectory from confusion. At other times however, and perhaps more surprising-
ly, confusion can turn into “productive confusion” (DiLeo et al., 2019) and result in cognitive 
improvement. We now turn to such cases to examine what the exact role of confusion might be 
in bringing about epistemic success. 
 Empirical research from educational psychology has suggested that confusion may be 
driving epistemic success in complex learning tasks. Complex learning tasks require learners to 
generate inferences, diagnose and solve problems, generate explanations, demonstrate applica-
tion and transfer acquired knowledge (Graesser et al., 2010). This form of deep learning can be 
contrasted with shallow learning activities (such as memorizing key phrases and facts) and sim-
ple forms of procedural learning. Importantly, complex learning tasks intrinsically convey cogni-
tive disequilibrium, impasses, contradiction, etc. Confusion constitutes one way to respond to 
cognitive disequilibrium, and perhaps a particularly (epistemically) beneficial way. 
 In fact, D’Mello & Graesser (2012) have shown that when subjects respond to cognitive 
disequilibrium with confusion, they seem to invest more effort in solving the problem and more 
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cognitive resources in the search for a resolution. Confusion seems to promote a deeper kind of 
inquiry: a more thorough information processing which facilitates complex forms of learning. 
More work from D’Mello et al. (2014) shows that confusion may also be particularly beneficial 
when conceptual change is the aim of the task, where subjects need to overcome misconceptions 
before developing a more sophisticated and accurate representation of some material (Kennedy 
& Lodge, 2016). It seems as though confusion helps subjects identify their erroneous approach to 
the material, but not only: confusion also seems to motivate a shift of approach, so that subjects 
experiencing confusion are more likely to look for and adopt alternative strategies to the prob-
lem. 
 Overall this literature suggests that experiencing confusion may be epistemically benefi-
cial, because: 1) we work harder cognitively when we feel (mildly) confused, investing more 
cognitive effort in the epistemic task, and 2) we investigate differently, we seek alternative ap-
proaches and strategies. While these effects have been observed and documented, the exact role 
of the experience of confusion in bringing about these beneficial responses has not clearly been 
modeled. How can we account for the correlation between feeling confused and deploying the 
two aforementioned tendencies in inquiry? In the next and last section, we show how our model 
of confusion as sketched in section II may explain this correlation. 
IV. Epistemic benefits of confusion 
We gather from the aforementioned studies that our faculty to feel confused might facilitate epis-
temic accomplishments that demand increased mental effort and shifts of strategy. This might, at 
first blush, appear puzzling. Experiences like curiosity and interest are generally the ones that are 
viewed as fit to motivate inquiry, since they appraise our cognitive coping potential as high (Sil-
via, 2010) . In fact, one might think that confusion only results in deep inquiry when it is fol2 -
lowed by exploratory kinds of affect which then provide the motivational power towards inquiry. 
Additionally, the studies just mentioned do not offer much explanation as to how – or in virtue of 
which of its properties – the feeling of confusion itself produces these effects, although they do 
attribute these effects to confusion and not to other emotions that might accompany or follow it.  
 Here is our idea of how confusion might function so that it sometimes produces behav-
ioral tendencies conducive to epistemic success. Noetic feelings do not only monitor properties 
of our ongoing cognitive operations; they also have a control dimension. They trigger reactions 
to the events they monitor (Nelson and Narens, 1990). If confusion comprises a noetic feeling, it 
 While some authors refer to interest and curiosity equally (e.g. Silvia, 2010), recent work (Pekrun, 2019) suggest 2
that both can be conceptualized as a trait and as a state. Here, we are only interested in curiosity as a state, that is, a 
short-lived emotional episode. 
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then does not only monitor our cognitive operations, it is also partly constituted by a control di-
mension. According to this model, feeling confused not only provides us with information re-
garding our cognitive competence at a task and how easily we might be able to perform it, it also 
generates control behaviors accordingly. It sends us a signal with the content “I cannot do this 
task easily” and it automatically prepares us for putting in the effort that the task requires, given 
how far we are from successful performance.  
Indeed, it is generally thought that the output of metacognitive monitoring activity also 
guides the regulation of control processes, and that learners exploit the subjective feelings pro-
duced by the monitoring activity to plan on how to invest their cognitive efforts. Hence, on the 
one hand, the metacognitive monitoring that leads to the subjective experience of confusion au-
tomatically triggers the recruitment of higher-level processes able to manage the not-so-easy task 
at hand. On the other hand, the subject can decide to consciously exploit the subjective feeling of 
confusion to plan her strategy around the learning task: either invest more effort and follow the 
inclination to “think deeper”, or decide to drop or postpone her efforts at resolving the task. In 
other words, noetic feelings automatically exert a causal role on behavior, and subjects can also 
use the metaknowledge provided by them to regulate their information processing and cognitive 
investment (Dokic, 2012; Koriat, 2007).  
 Thus, even if we can decide to abandon inquiry when feeling confused (given other 
needs, desires, and pragmatic factors such as time pressure), the feeling of confusion encompass-
es a spontaneous inclination to launch the more demanding cognitive strategies required by the 
not-easily-feasible task. As has recently been argued, while effort is perceived as costly, humans 
as well as some non-human animals associate effort with reward, so that the investment of effort 
itself (and not only its products) is perceived to have a positive value (Inzlicht et al., 2018). This 
speaks in favor of the otherwise counter-intuitive idea that feeling confused about some informa-
tion both makes the task appear more effortful, and inclines us to go forth with it.  
 If this picture of confusion is valid, in addition to allowing us to recognize that we are 
facing a cognitive obstacle, we have here suggested that feeling confused allows us to do so in a 
way which also triggers the recruitment of effortful cognitive strategies that are likely to help us 
overcome the obstacle and increase our chances of succeeding at the cognitive task. We suggest 
that future studies should assess how often confusion leads to either engagement or disengage-
ment, as its impact will depend on the perceived size of the obstacle, the perceived value of re-
moving it, and perceived coping potential (or control). 
!11
References 
Arguel, A., Lockyer, L., Lipp, O. V., Lodge, J. M., & Kennedy, G. (2017). Inside Out: De-
tecting Learners’ Confusion to Improve Interactive Digital Learning Environments. 
Journal of Educational Computing Research, 55(4), 526–551. https://doi.org/
10.1177/0735633116674732 
Bjork, R. A., & Bjork, E. L. (1992). A new theory of disuse and an old theory of stimulus 
fluctuation. In A. F. Healy, S. M. Kosslyn, & R. M. Shiffrin (Eds.), Essays in honor of 
William K. Estes. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Brown, S. R. (2000). Tip-of-the-tongue phenomena: An introductory phenomenological 
analysis. Consciousness and Cognition, 9(4), 516–537. 
Brown, A. S. (2003). A review of the deja vu experience. Psychological bulletin, 129(3), 
394. 
Darwin, C. (1872). The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/expression-of-the-emotions-in-
man-and-animals/0B7BDB02088055DAAB2FDB8DE304B47B 
De Sousa, R. (2009). Epistemic feelings. Mind and Matter, 7(2), 139-161. 
Di Leo, I., Muis, K. R., Singh, C. A., & Psaradellis, C. (2019). Curiosity… Confusion? 
Frustration! The role and sequencing of emotions during mathematics problem solv-
ing. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 58, 121–137. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.cedpsych.2019.03.001 
D’Mello, S., & Graesser, A. (2012). Dynamics of affective states during complex learning. 
Learning and Instruction, 22(2), 145–157. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.
2011.10.001 
D’Mello, S., Lehman, B., Pekrun, R., & Graesser, A. (2014). Confusion can be beneficial 
for learning. Learning and Instruction, 29, 153–170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.learnin-
struc.2012.05.003 
Dokic, J. (2012). Seeds of self-knowledge: noetic feelings and metacognition. Foundations 
of   metacognition, 6, 302-321. 
Ellsworth, P. C. (2003). Confusion, concentration, and other emotions of interest: Commen-
tary on Rozin and Cohen (2003). Emotion, 3(1), 81–85. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-
3542.3.1.81 
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge University Press. 
Graesser, A., Ozuru, Y., & Sullins, J. (2010). What is a good question? In Bringing reading 
research to life. (Guilford Press., pp. 112–141). M. G. McKeown & L. Kucan. 
Kennedy, G., & Lodge, J. M. (n.d.). All roads lead to Rome: Tracking students’ affect as 
they overcome misconceptions. 11.  
!12
Koriat, A. (1995). Dissociating knowing and the feeling of knowing: Further evidence for 
the accessibility model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124(3), 311. 
Koriat, A. (2000). The feeling of knowing: Some metatheoretical implications for con-
sciousness and control. Consciousness and cognition, 9(2), 149-171. 
Koriat, A. (2007). Metacognition and consciousness. Cambridge University Press.  
Lauria, F. (forthcoming). Interest and the Affective Springs of Inquiry – The “Chiaroscuro” 
Epistemic Emotion.  
LeDoux, J. E., & Hofmann, S. G. (2018). The subjective experience of emotion  : A fearful 
view. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 19, 67‑72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.-
cobeha.2017.09.011 
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation (pp. xiii, 557). Oxford University Press. 
Meylan, A. (2014). Epistemic emotions: a natural kind?. Philosophical inquiries, 2(1), 173-
190. 
Morton, A. (2009, December 3). Epistemic Emotions. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Emotion. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235018.003.0018 
Muis, K. R., Chevrier, M., & Singh, C. A. (2018). The role of epistemic emotions in per-
sonal epistemology and self-regulated learning. Educational Psychologist, 1–20. 
Muis, K. R., Pekrun, R., Sinatra, G. M., Azevedo, R., Trevors, G., Meier, E., & Heddy, B. 
C. (2015). The curious case of climate change: Testing a theoretical model of epis-
temic beliefs, epistemic emotions, and complex learning. Learning and Instruction, 
39, 168–183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2015.06.003 
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework and new find-
ings. In G. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in re-
search and theory (Vol 26, pp125-173). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  
Pekrun, R. (2019). The murky distinction between curiosity and interest: State of the art 
and future directions. Educational Psychology Review, 31, 905-914. 
Pekrun, R., & Linnenbrink-Garcia, L. (2012). Academic emotions and student engagement. 
In Handbook of research on student engagement (pp. 259–282). Springer. http://
link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4614-2018-7_12 
Pekrun, R., Vogl, E., Muis, K. R., & Sinatra, G. M. (2017). Measuring emotions during 
epistemic activities: The Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales. Cognition & Emo-
tion, 31(6), 1268–1276. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2016.1204989 
Rozin, P., & Cohen, A. B. (2003). High frequency of facial expressions corresponding to 
confusion, concentration, and worry in an analysis of naturally occurring facial ex-
p r e s s i o n s o f A m e r i c a n s . E m o t i o n , 3 ( 1 ) , 6 8 – 7 5 . h t t p s : / / d o i . o rg /
10.1037/1528-3542.3.1.68 
!13
Scherer, K. R. (1999). Appraisal theory. In Handbook of cognition and emotion (pp. 637–
663). John Wiley & Sons Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/0470013494.ch30 
Silvia, P. J. (2005). What is interesting? Exploring the appraisal structure of interest. Emo-
tion (Washington, D.C.), 5(1), 89–102. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.5.1.89 
Silvia, P. J. (2010). Confusion and interest: The role of knowledge emotions in aesthetic 
experience. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 4(2), 75–80. 
Silvia, P. J., Henson, R. A., & Templin, J. L. (2009). Are the sources of interest the same for 
everyone? Using multilevel mixture models to explore individual differences in ap-
praisal structures. Cognition & Emotion, 23(7), 1389–1406. https://doi.org/
10.1080/02699930902850528 
Turner, S. A., & Silvia, P. J. (2006). Must interesting things be pleasant? A test of compet-
ing appraisal structures. Emotion (Washington, D.C.), 6(4), 670–674. https://doi.org/
10.1037/1528-3542.6.4.670 
Whittlesea, B. W., & Williams, L. D. (2001). The discrepancy-attribution hypothesis: I. The 
heuristic basis of feelings and familiarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(1), 3. 
!14
